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Impulsive Responding in Alcoholics
Jennifer M. Mitchell, Howard L. Fields, Mark D’Esposito, and Charlotte A. Boettiger
Background: Impaired decision-making is one diagnostic characteristic of alcoholism. Quantifying
decision-making with rapid and robust laboratory-based measures is thus desirable for the testing of novel
treatments for alcoholism. Previous research has demonstrated the utility of delay discounting (DD) tasks
for quantifying differences in decision-making in substance abusers and normal controls. In DD paradigms
subjects choose between a small, immediate reward and a larger, delayed reward.
Methods: We used a novel computerized DD task to demonstrate that abstinent alcoholics (AA, n  14)
choose the larger, delayed option significantly less often than control subjects (n  14; p  0.02). This
difference in choice tendency was independent of subject age, gender, years of education, or socio-
economic status.
Results: All subjects discounted as a function of reward delay and amount, with alcoholics demonstrat-
ing steeper discounting curves for both variables. This tendency to discount delayed rewards was positively
correlated with subjective reports of both alcohol addiction severity (Drug Use Screening Inventory-
Revised, Domain 1, p  0.01), and impulsivity (Barratt Impulsivity Scale-11, p  0.004). Novel aspects of
thisnewparadigmincludeanelementoftimepressure,anadditionalexperimentalconditionthatevaluated
motor impulsivity by assessing the ability to inhibit a prepotent response, and another control condition to
requiring nonsubjective choice.
Conclusions: Non-alcoholic controls and alcoholics did not differ on motor impulsivity or nonsubjective
choice, suggesting that the differing choice behavior of the two groups was due mainly to differences in
cognitive impulsivity.
Key Words: Decision-Making, Choice, Inhibitory Control, Human.
A
diagnostic characteristic of alcoholism is the inability
to refrain from drinking even in the face of severe
consequences. This impairment may reflect faulty decision-
making, in which consequences are not effectively taken
into account before choosing a course of action. This would
represent a form of cognitive impulsivity. Alternatively,
such a failure of “willpower” may reflect poor inhibitory
control, in which one is unable to suppress an undesired
action. This would suggest a contribution of motor impul-
sivity to maladaptive drinking behavior. This latter possi-
bility is supported by anecdotal reports from alcoholics that
they are unable to resist drinking alcohol, despite being
aware of adverse consequences. Alcohol abuse is often
accompanied by extreme financial, social, and psychologi-
cal repercussions. Such problems may occur as an indirect
result of alcohol abuse, but the possibility remains that
alcoholism and other life problems may result, in part, from
common decision-making and/or impulse-control impair-
ments.
Whether decision-making deficits are a cause or a result
of alcoholism, understanding the neural basis of such im-
pairment is critical for the development of new treatments.
One approach toward this goal is to develop behavioral
paradigms that are compatible with cognitive neuroscience
techniques for measuring physiological correlates of behav-
ior. To this end, the implementation of a delay-discounting
(DD) task may prove especially useful, as DD is the only
decision-making paradigm demonstrated to be indepen-
dent of IQ within the normal range (Monterosso et al.,
2001; Kirby and Petry, 2004). DD tasks can be briefly
summarized as follows: subjects are given choices between
a small, sooner reward and a larger, delayed reward. Tra-
ditionally, the outcomes of a series of such choices are used
to estimate the present subjective value of a delayed reward
as a function of delay time, yielding hyperbolic temporal
discount curves (Mazur, 1987; Rachlin, 2000). Following
the influential rational theory of addiction proposed by
Becker and Murphy (1988), a number of studies have sup-
ported their hypothesis that preference for the present and
underweighting of delayed consequences contributes to ad-
dictive behaviors. For example, steeper discounting func-
tions have been associated with alcohol abuse (Vuchinich
and Simpson, 1998; Petry, 2001a), opiate abuse (Madden et
al., 1997; Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Kirby et al., 1999; Mad-
den et al., 1999; Odum et al., 2000; Kirby and Petry, 2004),
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pathological, gambling (Petry and Casarella, 1999; Petry,
2001b; Dixon et al., 2003; although cf Holt et al., 2003), and
cigarette smoking (Bickel et al., 1999; Mitchell, 1999;
Odum et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004).
However, to date, task designs used in previous studies of
delay discounting in substance abusers are not compatible
with cognitive neuroscience techniques, such as functional
MRI (fMRI). Our goal in the present study was to design a
DD task that would be compatible with fMRI or other
neurophysiological techniques. In addition, our task design
incorporates two novel control conditions. First, in previous
designs, motor impulsivity, or a tendency to generate an
unintended response, could have accounted for the ten-
dency to make impulsive choices. An alternative explana-
tion is that “impulsive” choices are the result of cognitive
impulsivity within the context of controlled motor respond-
ing. While resulting in the same outcome, the two possibil-
ities are likely to be implemented quite differently in terms
of underlying neural circuitry and have distinct implications
for treatment strategies. To address this confound, our task
incorporates a condition in which subjects are required to
select the outcome they don’t want instead of the one they
desire. In addition, we include a condition in which subjects
are required to make a selection based on objective, rather
than subjective criteria. By randomly varying the delay,
amount, discount, and trial type, and incorporating a time
limit for responding, subjects maintain attention, and are
less likely to use a strategy for consistency based on recall
of previous choices. In this way, each choice is made with
less interference from previous trials. Moreover, to be con-
sidered successful, it was essential that the task be able to
detect significant differences in the choice behavior of al-
coholics and control subjects. We report here the results of
using a novel computerized DD task to assess differences in
both cognitive impulsivity and motor impulsivity between
abstinent alcoholics (AA) and control subjects (CS).
Finally, while DD procedures are often used as a quan-
titative measure of impulsivity (Kirby and Marakovic, 1996;
Rachlin, 2000; Ainslie, 2001; Barkley et al., 2001; Bickel
and Marsh, 2001; Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Reynolds
and Schiffbauer, 2005), few studies have explicitly con-
firmed a correlation between delay discounting behavior
and subjective measures of impulsivity (Kirby et al., 1999;
Crean et al., 2000; Kirby and Petry, 2004). As impulsivity
may be an important risk factor for substance abuse (Jentch
and Taylor, 1999; Moeller et al., 2001; Gerald and Higley,
2002), we employed an independent measure of impulsiv-
ity, the Barratt Impulsivity Scale-11 (BIS), to confirm that
behavior in this paradigm correlates with subjective impul-
sivity scores. We hypothesized that alcoholics would dem-
onstrate greater cognitive impulsivity, as measured by
greater discounting of delayed rewards, and greater motor
impulsivity, manifest as poorer inhibitory control, than con-
trol subjects. In addition, we hypothesized that these be-
havioral measures would correlate with BIS scores.
METHODS
Subjects
Due to the impact of alcohol intoxication on decision-making (Steele &
Josephs, 1990), subjects were required to be abstinent from alcohol. In
addition, to minimize systematic differences in physiological state between
groups, we elected not to recruit active alcoholics, as this would have
required those subjects to be in a state of acute withdrawal. Alcoholic
subjects were recruited on the basis of a minimum of two weeks of
abstinence from alcohol. Three subjects reported relapse to drinking
alcohol after the initial screening, but prior to the experiment. Abstinence
duration for these three subjects was 1, 5, and 5 days . For the remaining
subjects abstinence duration ranged between two weeks and 17 years (by
self-report); for the entire group, the median reported abstinence time was
approximately five months. We chose to test these subjects, as 1) none
reported or demonstrated any detectable withdrawal symptoms at the time
of the experiment, and 2) our abstinence duration measure relied on self
report rather than an objective measure, such as liver enzyme levels, and
therefore cannot be taken as an absolute measure. Abstinent alcoholic
subjects (AA) were recruited through flyers posted by local recovery
organizations and through referral by addiction treatment professionals.
Control subjects (CS) were recruited by flyers posted in the local commu-
nity. Subjects were screened by telephone prior to participation. All
subjects were between 19 and 38 years of age and were screened for
neurological disease, psychoactive medications, current treatment for
other psychological disorders, and addiction to substances other than
alcohol. Control subjects were also screened for alcohol abuse. Due to the
high incidence of chronic tobacco use among alcoholics, nicotine addiction
was not considered grounds for exclusion for either group. Smokers
comprised approximately 33% of both groups, and smokers were allowed
smoking breaks if needed, thus, attentional deficits due to nicotine with-
drawal were unlikely to differentiate the two groups. Subjects who met our
inclusion criteria in the phone screening were invited to participate in the
task, which took place in a laboratory setting on the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley campus. Subjects provided written, informed consent, as
approved by the U.C.B. Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects.
Subjects were compensated approximately $60 for their participation.
Subjects completed the behavioral inventories in approximately 1 hr. The
delay discounting (DD) task lasted about one additional hour. A total of
16 alcoholic and 15 control subjects participated in the task. Two alcohol-
ics failed to meet our performance criterion on the DD task (see below),
and are excluded from the behavioral and demographic data. One control
subject did not identify themselves as an alcoholic, but had a score 8o n
the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT), indicating a
possible drinking problem, and was therefore excluded from all analyses.
Behavioral Inventories
Immediately prior to participating in the behavioral task, subjects filled
out a series of questionnaires. The AUDIT (Saunders et al., 1993) was
used to verify alcohol abuse severity, as it is the most sensitive alcohol
screening instrument with strong correlation to DSM-III-R diagnosis for
alcoholism (Bradley et al., 1998) and demonstrated cross-cultural validity
(Cherpital, 1998). Domain I of the Drug Use Screening Inventory-Revised
(DUSI; Tarter, 1990) provided additional information regarding the se-
verity of each subject’s alcohol abuse behaviors. DUSI scores are reported
in terms of the percent of affirmative answers from Domain 1, part B. For
the AUDIT & DUSI questionnaires only, subjects were asked to answer
according to the year prior to achieving abstinence if they had ceased
consuming alcohol. Due to our interest in whether affective and/or be-
havioral difference between groups could impact choice behavior, we
administered the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1996), the
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond and Lovibond,
1993), the Barratt Impulsivity Scale-11 (BIS; Patton et al., 1995), Rotter’s
Locus of Control Scale (LOC; Rotter, 1966), the South Oaks Gambling
Screen (SOGS; Lesieur and Blume, 1987), and the Future Time Perspec-
tive Inventory (FTPI; Wallace, 1956). We also collected information about
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et al., 1985). Occupation and education information were collected to
calculate the Hollingshead Socio-economic Status (SES) score (Hollings-
head, 1975).
Delay Discounting Task
Subjects were positioned in front of a color computer monitor and
instructed in the use of a keypad for response selection. Subjects were
given a brief practice session immediately prior to beginning the experi-
ment. Each behavioral session consisted of eight blocks of 47 or 48 trials
with rest periods between blocks as needed (total duration 1 hr ). Trials
were one of four conditions: “Want” (W), “Don’t want” (DW), and two
types of control decision conditions, “Sooner” and “Larger,” which are
considered together as “Control” (CON). Trial types were randomly
intermixed, with weighted ratios of 1/2 for the want W condition and 1/6
for the other three trial types. Trial type was indicated by a cue word that
instructed the subject how to choose between the two options that ap-
peared following the cue (Fig. 1). On each trial, two options were pre-
sented, each consisting of a dollar amount and a point in time. On every
trial, the delayed option was one of six “full” amounts ($1, $2, $5, $10, $20,
or $100) at one of five future delays (one week, two weeks, one month,
three months, or six months). The earlier option was always a lesser (or
“discounted”) amount available at an earlier time. In most cases, “Today”
was the earlier option, but three months was the earlier alternative for
some six-month-delay trials. The discounting rate randomly varied among
the following four percentages: 70, 85, 90, or 95%. This range of discounts
was selected based on pilot studies, which demonstrated that subjects
needed to “think over” their selection with options in this range (data not
shown). Interestingly, this discount range corresponds to “difficult” deci-
sions in a recent report showing that difficult and “easy” decisions appear
to recruit distinct brain circuits (McClure et al., 2004). We refer to these
two alternatives as the “earlier” versus the “later” option. The earlier and
later options randomly appeared on the right or the left side of the
computer monitor. In the W condition, subjects were asked to choose the
option they preferred, as though they would actually receive the money at
the time specified. Hypothetical rewards were used based on results from
numerous studies comparing choices for real versus hypothetical monetary
rewards in discounting paradigms (Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Johnson
and Bickel (2002); Madden et al., 2003; Madden et al., 2004; Lagorio and
Madden, 2005). Subjects then indicated their choice by pressing one of
two buttons on a keypad. In the DW condition, subjects were asked to
make the same evaluation, but to press the button corresponding to the
opposite choice. The Sooner & Larger (CON) conditions served as con-
trols to ensure that subjects comprehended and were compliant with the
task instructions. In these trials, no subjective evaluation was required;
subjects simply pressed the button corresponding to the side with the
sooner time point or larger amount of money, respectively. The order of
trial types did not vary across subjects; however, the delayed amount, delay
time, and discount rate were randomly selected on each trial. Two subjects
were excluded from behavioral data analysis due to chance performance
levels on CON trials.
Data Analysis
While DD paradigms have traditionally focused on the “indifference
point” (Kirby and Petry 2004; Vuchinich and Simpson, 1998; Petry 2001;
Crean et al., 2000), we chose to develop a novel design, compatible with
functional magnetic resonance imaging. Instead of indifference point-
based discount rates, we used two indices of discounting: the proportion of
earlier choices made, a measure previously used by Ainslie and
Monterosso (2003), and the ratio of the cumulative dollar amount chosen
to the maximum dollar amount available. These values were calculated
across all W trials, as well as divided according to delay time and delayed
choice amount. As the results for six months versus either Today or three
months did not differ, these trial types were collapsed for analysis pur-
poses. In contrast to breakpoint analyses, which result in hyperbolic
discount rates (k), our design does not allow robust determination of k.
This is due to the fact that our maximum discount was fixed at 70%. The
range of 70-95% was chosen on the basis of pilot experiments (data not
Fig. 1. Illustration of behavioral paradigm. A) The temporal sequence of events are shown for one example Want (W) trial. Illumination of a fixation point (“Ready”)
indicated the initiation of each trial. The instruction cue was then displayed for two seconds, alerting the subject to the upcoming trial type. The four instruction cues
were color coded by type: Want  green, Don’t want  red, Sooner  yellow, Larger  magenta. The two options (“earlier” and “later”; see Materials and Methods
for values) were then presented while the instruction cue remained on the screen. The choices remained on the screen for 2 sec, however subjects had a total of 6
sec to indicate their choice following the appearance of the two options. B) Depiction of the four trial types. The four trial types included W, Don’t Want (DW), and two
controls (CON): Sooner and Larger. Trial ratio was 1/2 for the W condition and 1/6 each for the other three trial types.
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some of the time within this range. This range was selected as one in which
subjects in both AA and CS groups would both evaluate the choices,
rather than taking a strategy of always picking the sooner or later option.
However, limiting our discounts to this range likely results in an under-
estimation of k. This suspicion was borne out by empirical test; we derived
k from the cumulative dollar ratio (CDR) for each delay time (D) accord-
ing to the following equation (Mazur, 1987):
CDR  1/(1 kD) (1)
and taking the mean k across delay times. Consistent with expectation, the
AA group demonstrated significantly larger values of k, and thus significantly
faster discounting rates than the CS group (0.005  0.001, and 0.001  3 
10
4, respectively (mean  SEM), p  0.02, t  3.78). However, the values
for both are much lower than expected for true values of k. Rather, delay-
discounting frequency as a function of delay time and delayed amount were
well fit by logarithmic functions. Both the slope and intercept of these fits
were measured using the built in curve-fitting function in Microsoft Excel.
Thus as our task appears not to accurately estimate k, this is not an appro-
priate dependent measure.
For single factor statistical comparisons between groups we used unpaired
two-tailed t-tests. For multi-factorial comparisons, we used mixed ANOVAs,
using group as a between subjects factor. Where sphericity assumptions were
violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction for inhomogeneity of variance was
applied. Moreover, to ensure the validity of parametric statistical tests, when
data were not normally distributed, appropriate arcsine-root transformation
was applied prior to statistical comparison, (instances specified in Results),
nonparametric tests were applied using an Excel add-in (Analyze-It Software,
Ltd.). Regression analysis and macro-based analysis of covariance (AN-
COVA) were also performed using commercially available software (Excel).
Reward preference in DW trials was inferred as the rejected option. In other
words, when asked to choose the reward they did not want, a subject choosing
the left option was assumed to want the right option. The absolute difference
between the actual and inferred earlier:later choice ratios for each delay was
used as a measure of inhibitory control.
RESULTS
Familial Alcohol Abuse
The AA group in our study reported a significantly greater
number of family members with possible or definite drinking
problems than did the control subjects (CS; Table 1). While
this represents an unsubstantiated subjective report, the FTQ
has been validated as a reliable instrument for assessing fa-
milial alcohol abuse (Mann et al., 1985). Table 1 also includes
summary data regarding the individual alcohol abuse histories
of our subjects. The fact that the AA group scored signifi-
cantly higher than the CS group on measures of alcohol abuse
(AUDIT & DUSI) is not unexpected. These data support the
presence of a personal history of alcohol abuse and provided
quantification of the degree of difference between individual
subjects as well as between groups.
Psychometric Comparisons of AA and CS Groups
To detect whether any observed group differences in
either choice behavior or inhibitory control were due to
behavioral trait differences between the AA and CS
groups, we collected a series of subjective measures. In
cases where the AA and CS groups differed significantly
(Table 2), we tested the correlation between that behav-
ioral measure and the task behavior parameter of interest.
Alcoholics, as a population, suffer from depression at a
higher rate than nonalcoholics (Merikangas and Gelernter,
1990). Since depressed mood could theoretically increase
the discounting of future rewards, we collected depression
data via the BDI. Consistent with previous findings, the AA
group reported significantly more depression than the CS
group, however the mean scores for both groups were
below that considered diagnostic for clinical depression
(12; Table 2).
Alcoholics also suffer disproportionately from anxiety
disorders (Weiss and Rosenberg, 1985). Since anxiety or
stress could affect performance on this task, particularly in
terms of inhibitory control, we collected generalized “emo-
tional distress” data via the Depression Anxiety and Stress
Scales (DASS; Table 2). Consistent with our BDI data, the
groups differed significantly on the depression subscale (6.7
 6.8 vs. 1.4  2.4, p  0.01). The DASS anxiety subscale
also demonstrated a higher level of anxiety in the AA group
compared to the CS group (5.5  7.6 vs. 0.5  0.7, respec-
tively, p  0.022).
Another factor with the potential to impact explicit
choice behavior is Locus of Control, a trait also previously
reported to differ between alcoholics and controls (Mills
and Taricone, 1991). Our findings are consistent with pre-
vious findings, in that the AA group demonstrated a sig-
nificantly more external Locus of Control than the CS
group (Table 2). However, for the alcoholics in our sample,
both the mean (10.9) and the median (10) fell into the
middle range, reflecting neither internal nor external dom-
inance in attribution style (Rotter, 1966).
Another factor that might impact delay discounting be-
havior, potentially resulting in a difference between groups
is orientation toward the future. Substance abusers have
been reported to operate on a foreshortened time horizon,
although some studies have not found systematic differ-
ences between alcoholics and controls (Smart, 1968; Hul-
bert and Lens, 1988; Petry et al., 1998). The AA and CS
groups did not significantly differ in the maximum event
extension on the Future Time Perspective Inventory (FTPI,
part I; Table 2). There was also no detectable difference
between groups in mean event extension or Pearson corre-
lation (p  0.24, and p  0.89, respectively). Nonparamet-
ric tests (Mann-Whitney U test) also failed to distinguish
the two groups on any FTPI measures (data not shown),
Table 1. Personal and Family History of Alcoholism
Group FTQ
(p  0.008)
AUDIT
(p  0.001)
DUSI (I)
(p  0.001)
AA (n  14) 2.9  2.6 20.9  8.4 71  28%
CS (n  14) 0.9  0.9 4.9  2.0 15  14%
Data from the Family Tree Questionnaire (FTQ), Drug Use Screening Inventory,
Domain I (DUSI-I) and Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT).
Values are reported as mean  standard deviation. Reported p-values reflect
the results of unpaired two-tailed comparisons between groups. Exact p-values
reported unless p  0.001.
AA, Abstinent alcoholic; CS, Control subject.
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tion in the AA group.
As we measured subjects’ valuation of hypothetical mon-
etary rewards, gambling tendencies could factor into ex-
plicit choices. Moreover, pathologic gambling has been
found to co-occur with substance abuse (Crockford and
el-Guebaly, 1998). Indeed, South Oaks Gambling Screen
scores indicated significantly greater gambling tendencies
among the AA group (Table 2). Finally, as our paradigm
was designed to objectively measure impulsive responding,
we wished to determine whether choice behavior and in-
hibitory control in this task correlated with a subjective
measure of impulsiveness. Consistent with previous find-
ings (Nagoshi et al., 1991; Chalmers et al., 1993; Petry
2001a), the AA group was significantly more impulsive
(Table 2), based on responses on the BIS.
Reaction Times and Accuracy
Both subject groups showed slower reaction times (RT) for
conditions requiring greater cognitive processing (Table 3).
This supports the inference that subjects are engaging addi-
tional processes for the subjective decision trials (W) com-
pared to the objective decision trials (CON). Furthermore,
these data also indicate that DW trials, in which subjects were
instructed to decide which option they preferred and select
the opposite one, engaged further processes beyond those in
the W condition. A one-way ANOVA with group (AA, CS) as
a between subjects factor demonstrated a significant main
effect of trial type on RT (F(1.2,32.2)  61.05, p  0.001), no
main effect of group (F(1,26)  0.002, p  0.962), but a trend
toward a group  trial type interaction (F(1.2,32.2)  3.252,
p  0.073). Post hoc tests demonstrated no significant differ-
ences between groups for any trial type (minimum p  0.24)
suggesting that the AA and CS groups showed a different
pattern of increasing RT with trial type. Both subject groups
demonstrated high accuracy in the CON trials (Table 3), and
performance on these trials was not significantly different
between groups (t(26)  1.18, p  0.249). Taken together,
these results indicate that both groups understood and were
compliant with the task instructions.
The AA Group Chose the Earlier Option Significantly More
Often Than the CS Group
Over the course of the entire experiment, the AA group
more frequently chose the earlier option in the W trials
(Fig. 2A). To assess the cumulative result of each subject’s
decision-making, we calculated a cumulative gain ratio,
based on the sum of all W trial selections divided by the
total possible monetary gain (corresponding to a “later”
choice in every W trial). As shown in Fig. 2B, the decisions
Fig. 2. Comparison between groups of cumulative discounting behavior in W
trials. A) Over the course of the experiment, the AA group chose the earlier option
significantly more frequently than the CS group (t(26)  2.92, p  0.007). B) The
AA group accumulated significantly less total theoretical gain over the course of
the experiment (t(26)  3.10, p  0.005). Gain is expressed as a ratio of selected
options to the maximum money available (i.e., if subjects had chosen the later
option on every trial).
Table 2. Psychometric Comparison of Subject Groups
Group BDI BIS DASS FTPI LOC SOGS
p-value p  0.004 p  0.001 p  0.028 p  0.195 p  0.009 p  0.044
AA (n  14) 10.5  10.0 75.1  6.6 21.4  23.8 23.9  17.1 10.9  3.4 1.4  2.2
CS (n  14) 1.9  2.1 57.0  9.9 6.1  5.7 34.1  23.1 7.4  2.5 0.1  0.5
Psychometric data gathered via inventories. Values are reported as mean  standard deviation. Reported p -values reflect the results of unpaired two-tailed
comparison between groups. Exact p -values reported unless p  0.001.
AA, Abstinent alcoholic; CS, Control subject; BIS, Barratt Impulsivity Scale-11; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; DASS, Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale; FTPI,
Future Time Perspective Inventory; LOC, Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale; SOGS, South Oaks Gambling Screen.
Table 3. Reaction Times and Accuracy Data
Group CON W DW ACC
AA (n  14) 1510  118 1796  124 2026  123 94  2%
CS (n  14) 1343  83 1898  110 2112  127 97  2%
Group comparison of reaction times for each trial type and CON accuracy.
There was a significant effect of trial type on reaction time (RT) based on a mixed
effects ANOVA (p  0.001); however, there was not a significant effect of group
on RT (p  0.962). Accuracy in CON trials did not show a statistically significant
difference between groups (unpaired 2-tailed t-test; p  0.249).
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mulative gain than for the CS group.
Effect of Delay Time and Reward Amount on Reward
Choice
The frequency with which subjects chose the earlier
amount in the W trials varied as a function of the delay time
(Fig. 3A). A mixed effects 2  5 ANOVA found significant
main effects of both group (F(1,26)  8.809; p  0.006), and
delay time (F(2.4,61.7)  14.83; p  0.001). A subsequent 2 
2 mixed effects ANOVA considering only the 7 days and
180 days delay times found a highly significant effect of
delay time (F(1,26)  9.461; p  0.005). Neither the full
(F(1,26)  1.211; p  0.309) nor the reduced (F(1,26)  1.769;
p  0.195) ANOVA revealed a significant Group  Delay
interaction, suggesting that the slope of the temporal dis-
counting function did not differ between groups, but that
the intercept of these functions was different. Direct com-
parison of the slope and intercept terms of the logarithmic
fit to each subject’s temporal discounting curve supported
this conclusion (Fig. 3B). The intercept differences suggest
that within this range of discount rates, the delay time
which initiates discounting in the AA group is shorter than
in the CS group. Additionally, the lack of difference be-
tween slopes indicates that once temporal discounting is
initiated, the rate of further discounting with increasing
delay is similar between groups.
The tendency to choose the earlier amount in the W
trials also varied as a function of the delayed reward
amount (Fig. 4). A 2  6 mixed effects ANOVA found
significant main effects of group (F(1,26)  6.715; p  0.015)
and amount (F(2.4,62.2)  17.41; p  0.001). This analysis did
not detect a significant Group  Amount interaction
(F(2.4,62.2)  2.395; p  0.090), suggesting that the slope of
the reward magnitude discounting function did not differ
between groups, but that the intercept of these functions
was different. Direct comparison of the slope and intercept
terms of the logarithmic fit to each subject’s reward mag-
nitude discounting curve partially supported this conclu-
sion. The average slopes did not differ between groups.
Means were 0.05  0.02 and 0.08  0.02 for the AA
and CS groups, respectively (t(26)  0.93, p  0.361). How-
ever, the intercepts showed only a trend toward a differ-
ence between groups. The mean intercepts were 0.84 
0.06 and 0.61  0.11 for the AA and CS groups, respec-
tively (t(26)  1.86, p  0.074). The simplest explanation for
these findings is that the AA group differs from the CS
group in their evaluation of relative reward magnitudes. In
other words, AA perceive the subjective values of $20 and
$14 to be in a larger ratio than do CS, thereby increasing
the likelihood of AA selecting the earlier, lesser amount.
AA Impulsive Choices Are Not Due to Impaired Inhibition
While the AA group responded differently than the CS
group in the W condition, it is unclear whether this behavior
was “intentional,” i.e., whether the AA group actually pre-
ferred the earlier to the later options. Intentional preference
differences would be consistent with recent literature regard-
ing temporal discounting of alcoholics (Vuchinich and Simp-
son, 1998; Petry, 2001a). However, our task includes an ele-
ment of mild time pressure that those tasks did not, which
could have caused unintended responses. As a result, group
differences in the W condition may be due to increased un-
intended responding or inhibitory failure in the AA group. To
Fig. 3. Comparison of temporal discounting functions. A) Ratio of earlier:later
choices as a function of later choice delay time. Data reflect mean  SEM. Curves
represent logarithmic fit of the group averaged data, regression terms are shown
for each group. B) Comparison by subject group of individual curve fit parame-
ters. Left panel: Group comparison of discount curve intercepts. The AA group
had significantly higher intercept terms (t (26)  3.94, p  0.001). Right panel: In
contrast, the slope of the discount curves did not show a significant difference
between groups (t (26)  1.60, p  0.123).
Fig. 4. Comparison of reward magnitude discounting functions. Semilog plot
of earlier:later choice ratio as a function of the later reward amount. Data reflect
mean  SEM. Curves represent logarithmic fit the group averaged data, with
regression terms shown for each group.
ALCOHOLISM AND IMPULSIVITY 2163test this possibility, we included the DW condition, which, due
to its relatively lower frequency, requires a heightened level of
control to avoid making erroneous responses. In addition, in
the DW condition, subjects were instructed to select one
option and then to execute a response indicating the opposite
of that selection, which should require a greater level of
response inhibition relative to the W condition. If alcoholics
are making more discounted choices in the W condition due
to inhibitory failure, we would expect to see even greater
inhibitory failure in the DW condition for that group. How-
ever, when we compared the absolute value of the difference
between each subject’s discounted choice ratio (W condition)
and the inferred discounted choice ratio (DW condition), we
found that the AA and CS groups were not significantly
different (t(26)  1.49, p  0.148; Fig. 5A). Indeed, there was
a tendency for greater mismatch between W and inferred W
choices in the CS group. When the inferred choice ratio is
plotted as a function of delay time, and the data are compared
to the fits derived from the W trials, no systematic difference
is evident between the AA and CS groups (Fig. 5B). This was
statistically verified with a mixed-design repeated measures
ANOVA, which found no main effect of group on choice
mismatch (F(1,25)  0.654; p  0.426). There was also no
significant main effect of delay time on choice mismatch
(F(4,100)  1.244; p  0.297), and no significant interaction
between group and delay time F(4,100)  1.199; p  0.316). A
second repeated measures group  amount ANOVA found
no significant effects (all F’s 1.0). Thus, it appears that the
AA group does not show increased motor impulsivity relative
to the CS group, and that differences in explicit choice behav-
ior are not attributable to inhibitory failure.
Discounting Behavior Is Not Dependent on Demographic
Factors
While every attempt was made to match subject groups
for demographic variables, in the end, the two groups
differed somewhat in several domains (Table 4). To test
whether demographic differences between groups might be
driving the group difference in choice behavior, we 1)
stratified the groups according to categorical variables
(gender and ethnicity) and tested for differences between
groups, 2) tested the correlation between continuous vari-
ables (education and SES) and discounting behavior, and
3) used an ANCOVA to determine whether controlling for
demographic factors eliminated the difference between
groups in discounting behavior.
Direct comparison of male and female subjects revealed
no significant difference in earlier:later choice ratio (62 
9, and 56  10, respectively (mean  SEM), p  0.62).
Likewise, white and nonwhite subjects did not demonstrate
significantly different choice behavior (55  7, and 62  9,
respectively (mean  SEM), p  0.33). These results
strongly suggest that gender and ethnic differences between
the AA and CS subject groups are not driving the differ-
ences in choice behavior between these groups. As our
experimental groups differed in terms of average years of
education and SES, we tested the correlation between
these values and earlier:later choice ratio. We found that
the tendency to choose a smaller immediate reward did not
correlate with years of education (r  0.07, t  0.35, p 
0.731). If we used general education level scores instead of
actual years, we again saw no correlation (r  0.06, t 
0.29, p  0.771). Similarly, SES was not significantly
correlated with earlier:later choice ratio (r  0.06, t 
Fig. 5. Motor impulsivity comparison between groups. Data shown reflects
mean  SEM A) Average absolute value of the difference between each subject’s
W earlier:later choice ratio and DW inferred earlier:later choice ratio. The AA and
CS groups showed statistically equivalent discrepancies between their inferred
choice ratio and actual choice ratio, a measure of inhibitory failure (t (26)  1.49,
p  0.148). B) Plot of inferred discounted choice ratio (from DW trials) as a
function of later choice delay time. Solid lines represent logarithmic fit to the DW
data, while the dashed lines depict fits to W data (Fig. 3A). Data demonstrates that
members of the AA group are no more likely to make mistakes in the DW
condition than members of the CS group.
Table 4. Demographic Data
Group
Age
(yrs)
Gender
(% male)
Ethnicity
(% white)
Education
(yrs) SES
p-value 0.178 0.246 0.115 0.010 0.036
AA (n  14) 29  6 71% 50% 15  33 8  14
CS (n  14) 26  6 46% 77% 18  44 9  12
Demographic data gathered via self-report. Values are reported as mean 
standard deviation. Reported p-values reflect the results of unpaired two-tailed
comparison between groups, or 
2 test (gender and ethnicity).
AA, Abstinent alcoholic; SES, Hollingshead Socio-economic status score.
2164 MITCHELL ET AL.0.3, p  0.768). In addition, there was no significant
correlation within groups between SES and discounting
frequency (p  0.55, and p  0.08, for the AA and CS
groups, respectively). These results indicate that the differ-
ences between the choice tendencies of the AA and CS
groups were not due to education or to socioeconomic
differences between the two groups.
Alcohol Addiction Severity Is Positively Correlated with
Discounted Choice Frequency
While our AA and CS groups clearly differed in terms of
their choice behavior, suggesting that alcoholism and in-
creased discounting of delayed rewards are coexisting
traits, a stronger link would be made by testing for a direct
correlation between alcohol addiction severity and dis-
counting behavior. When we tested the correlation between
earlier:later choice ratio and DUSI scores, not surprisingly,
we indeed found a significant correlation (r  0.48, t  2.8,
p  0.01; Fig. 6). Moreover, when we used an ANCOVA to
test for a difference in the discounted choice ratios of the
AA and CS groups after controlling for DUSI scores, we
found that the two groups were no longer significantly
different (p  0.308). This suggests that the difference in
choice behavior between groups is tightly correlated with
the severity of alcohol abuse history. However, we did not
find significant within-group correlation of DUSI and im-
pulsive choice (p  0.26, and p  0.84, for the AA and CS
groups, respectively), perhaps reflecting our small sample
size. The correlation between impulsive choice and AUDIT
scores showed a non-significant trend (r  0.36, t  2.0,
p  0.060). However, the AUDIT has three subscales:
consumption, alcohol-dependence, and alcohol-related
harm. When we excluded the consumption subscale and
only considered the dependence and harm subscales, as
these better reflect addiction severity, we again found a
significant positive correlation between addiction severity
and impulsive choices (r  0.41, t  2.3, p  0.031).
However, again this correlation did not remain within
groups (p  0.52, and p  0.76, for the AA and CS groups,
respectively). As there was heterogeneity within our AA
group with regard to abstinence duration, we examined the
correlation between time abstinent (in days) vs. earlier:
later choice ratio within the AA group. We found that time
abstinent was not a reliable predictor of delay discounting
in the AA group (r  0.22, t  0.8, p  0.451). We also
found that a higher frequency of earlier choices was corre-
lated with a greater number of family members who abuse
alcohol (r  0.39, t  2.1, p  0.043). This correlation
appeared to be mainly driven by the AA group (r  0.33, vs.
r  0.02 for the CS group), although neither within group
correlation was significant (p  0.24, and p  0.95, for the
AA and CS groups, respectively).
Discounting Is Positively Correlated with Subjective
Impulsivity
As shown in Table 2, the AA and CS groups differed on
a number of psychometric measures including depression,
impulsivity, emotional distress, locus of control, and gam-
bling behavior. Therefore, we tested the correlation be-
tween these values and earlier:later choice ratio. We found
that the tendency to prefer a smaller, earlier reward did not
correlate significantly with a subject’s level of emotional
distress, as measured by the DASS (r  0.27, t  1.42, p 
0.167). We also determined that a subject’s time horizon, as
measured by either the maximum or mean extension in the
FTPI, part I, did not correlate significantly with earlier:
later choice ratio (r  -0.08, t  0.41, p  0.687; r  0.17,
t  0.11, p  0.563, respectively). Similarly, a subject’s
locus of control rating did not significantly correlate with
earlier:later choice ratio (r  0.26, t  1.42, p  0.166).
Finally, a subject’s tendency to gamble, as measured by the
SOGS did not correlate with their choice behavior in this
DD task (r  0.03, t  0.15, p  0.882). We did detect
a trend toward a significant correlation between depression
(BDI) scores and temporal discounting (r  0.37, t  2.04,
p  0.051). However, when we used an ANCOVA to test
for a difference in the earlier:later choice ratios of the AA
and CS groups after controlling for BDI scores, we found
that the groups remained significantly different in their
discounted choice frequencies (F (1,25)  4.29, p  0.049).
This suggests that the difference between groups in choice
behavior is not determined solely by differences in depres-
sion levels between the two groups. Taken together, these
results indicate that the differences between the impulsive
choice tendencies of the AA and CS groups were largely
independent of differences between the two groups on
these psychometric measures.
In contrast, we did find significant correlations between
discounting behavior and the psychometric parameter of
subjective impulsivity (Fig. 7). When we tested the corre-
lation between discounted choice ratio and BIS score, we
found a significant positive correlation (r  0.53, t  3.18,
p  0.004; Fig. 7A). Significant positive correlations were
also found with each of the attention, motor, and nonplan-
ning BIS subscales (Attention: r  0.58, t  3.65, p  0.001;
Fig. 6. Severity of alcohol abuse history positively correlates with impulsive
choice frequency. The linear fit is derived from the data of all subjects considered
together. The two subjects groups are plotted separately for clarity.
ALCOHOLISM AND IMPULSIVITY 2165Motor: r  0.44, t  2.46, p  0.021; Nonplanning: r  0.39,
t  2.16, p  0.04). Of these, the only significant within-
group correlation was for CS impulsive choice versus BIS-
Attention (r  0.539, t  2.21, p  0.047). When we applied
an ANCOVA to test for a difference in the earlier:later
choice ratios of the AA and CS groups after controlling for
BIS scores, we found that the two groups were no longer
significantly different (F(1,25)  0.77, p  0.387). This result
suggests that our DD task provides a reliable measure of
how impulsive a given subject is, regardless of alcohol
abuse history. As we also found a strong correlation be-
tween individual alcohol addiction severity and impulsive
choice frequency, we tested for a correlation between indi-
vidual BIS and DUSI scores. We found that the BIS and
DUSI scores were indeed highly correlated (r  0.78, t 
6.36, p  0.001; Fig. 7B). Moreover, this correlation re-
mained significant within the AA group (r  0.58, t  2.49,
p  0.028), indicating that impulsive traits reliably predict
alcohol addiction severity. There was a trend toward a
similar correlation within the CS group (r  0.47, t  1.84,
p  0.091). Similar results were obtained when we com-
pared BIS and AUDIT scores, whether full scale (r  0.67,
t  4.59, p  0.001), or dependence and harm subscales
only (r  0.66, t  4.45, p  0.001) were analyzed.
DISCUSSION
Alcoholism and Impulsivity
Impulsivity is widely accepted as an essential feature of
substance abuse disorders, including alcoholism (Jentsch
and Taylor, 1999; Moeller et al., 2001). In fact, impulsivity
has been proposed to be a key risk factor for alcoholism
(Gerald and Higley, 2002). However, the relationship be-
tween alcoholism and impulsivity remains somewhat con-
troversial. While some studies suggest that alcoholics are
significantly more impulsive than control subjects (Colder
& Chassen, 1997; Soloff et al., 2000; Mulder 2002; Simons
et al., 2004), others have found no correlation between
alcoholism and impulsivity (Lejoyeux et al., 1988).
Our results support the idea that alcoholism is associated
with elevated levels of both cognitive impulsivity, as mea-
sured by choices in our DD task, and impulsive trait, as
measured by the BIS-11. However, our results do not sup-
port the conclusion that abstinent alcoholics experience
elevated motor impulsivity (Liraud et al., 2000). This dis-
sociation of cognitive and motor impulsivity is consistent
with previous findings suggesting the relative independence
of systems mediating long-term delay of gratification and
short-term behavioral inhibition (Crean et al., 2002). More-
over, there is evidence that opioid, amphetamine, nicotine,
and cocaine addicts also discount delayed rewards to a
greater extent than do controls on DD tasks (Bickel et al.,
1999; Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Kirby et al., 1999; Bickel &
Marsch, 2001; Heyman & Dunn, 2002; Coffey et al., 2003).
This suggests that the form of impulsivity assayed by DD
tasks is a general feature of addiction, representing an
important risk factor, a long-term consequence, or both.
Although subjects in the AA group appeared to have nor-
mal future orientation, perhaps reflecting the process of
recovery, both impulsivity and impaired decision-making
persisted in abstinence from alcohol. In fact, impulsivity
was independent of abstinence duration. Thus, impulsivity
may represent a potential risk factor not only for alcohol-
ism, but also for relapse to drinking.
An important caveat with regard to these results is that
the sample sizes are rather small. Thus, despite the robust-
ness and statistical significance of our results, it is uncertain
that our findings represent the population as a whole. We
can assert that experimental volunteers who self-identify as
alcoholics who have chosen to cease drinking alcohol ap-
pear to be both more impulsive and to more readily dis-
count delayed monetary rewards than do control volun-
teers. It’s possible that our AA volunteers represent a
subtype of alcoholic phenotype, a possibility that may merit
genetic investigation.
Impulsivity and Delay Discounting
One conception of impulsivity is an inability to delay
gratification. This view is supported by reports that individ-
uals with impulsive disorders discount future rewards more
Fig. 7. Subjective impulsivity, impulsive choices, and alcoholism. A) Subjec-
tive ratings of impulsivity positively correlate with impulsive choice frequency. B)
Subjective ratings of impulsivity also positively correlate with alcohol addiction
severity. For both panels, the linear fit is derived from the data of all subjects
considered together. The two subjects groups are plotted separately for illustra-
tive purposes.
2166 MITCHELL ET AL.steeply (Crean et al., 2000; Barkley et al., 2001; Petry,
2001). Moreover, numerous studies using animal models of
impulsivity also demonstrate temporal discounting of re-
wards (Evenden, 1999; Cardinal et al., 2001; Kheramin et
al., 2004; Winstanley et al., 2004). Further evidence that
DD is dissociable from motor impulsivity or inhibitory
control deficits comes from studies of tryptophan depletion
in humans, which impairs inhibitory control without alter-
ing temporal discounting curves (Crean et al., 2002). How-
ever, the supposition that discounting is a valid indicator of
impulsivity is not without controversy (Monterosso and
Ainslie, 1999; Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Frederick et
al., 2002; Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2005). While some
investigators have found correlations between discounting
behavior and subjective impulsivity scores (Swann et al.,
2002), others have found weak or no correlation between
the two measures (Mitchell, 1999; Lane et al., 2003). Some
of these differences are likely due to the wide range of
methodological approaches used in the study of delay dis-
counting. The strong correlations that we report here be-
tween BIS scores and delay discounting behavior thus pro-
vide valuable reinforcement for the validity of delay
discounting behavior as a measure of impulsivity.
Possible Neural Mechanisms Underlying Impulsive Choice
Behavior
A number of possibilities exist regarding the neural basis
of impulsive choice. Clinical data and lesion studies point
to orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction as a possible substrate
(Berlin et al., 2004; Winstanley et al., 2004). However,
there is also evidence in humans that frontal lobe damage
has no impact on temporal discounting of rewards (Fellows
and Farah, 2005). Several subcortical structures have also
been implicated in animal studies of impulsive choice, for
example the basolateral amygdala (Winstanley et al., 2004),
the core of the nucleus accumbens (Cardinal et al., 2001),
and the hippocampus (Cheung and Cardinal, 2005). Alter-
natively, specific neurochemical abnormalities may under-
lie impulsive choice. The serotonergic system is the most
commonly studied with regard to delayed reward prefer-
ence (Ho et al., 1999). However, while low CSF serotonin
metabolite levels have been associated with impulsive be-
havior (Moeller et al., 2001; Gerald and Higley, 2002),
serotonin depletion does not alter DD behavior in humans
(Crean et al., 2002). This latter result makes us inclined to
suspect that other systems are more critically involved in
impulsive decision-making. For example, the endogenous
opioid system has been implicated in an animal model of
delayed reward choice (Kieres et al., 2004). The possibility
that endogenous opioids regulate preference for immediate
versus delayed rewards remains to be tested in humans.
Alcoholics are known to experience reduced endogenous
opioid signaling even after prolonged abstinence, lending
support to this hypothetical mechanism (del Arbol et al.,
1995). Another intriguing possibility for increased reward
discounting in abstinent alcoholics is HPA axis dysregula-
tion. This possibility is supported by reports that abstinent
alcoholics have relatively lower basal cortisol levels (An-
thenelli et al., 2001), a condition that may dissipate over
many years of abstinence (del Arbol et al., 1995). More-
over, Takahashi (2004) recently reported that basal cortisol
levels are negatively correlated with discounted reward
choice in humans. There is also evidence that dopaminergic
systems may play an important role in deciding between
immediate and delayed rewards (Wade et al., 2000).
In summary, we have found that abstinent alcoholics
discount delayed rewards to a greater extent than do con-
trols and that this discounting tendency is sensitive to both
delay time and reward magnitude. This enhanced temporal
discounting is associated with more severe alcohol addic-
tion and higher subjective ratings of impulsivity but is not
due to a relative impairment of inhibitory control. Future
investigations of the underlying neural mechanisms of this
choice behavior may prove illuminating for the develop-
ment of therapeutic interventions for alcoholism and other
impulsive behaviors.
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